Transworld Depravity (TWD) is the thesis that possibly every feasible
world with significantly free agents contains moral evil. I will offer
an argument, assuming Molinism [well, yeah, you gotta assume Molinism; I mean, come on! – j], that TWD is necessarily false.
Hmmm… interesting. Confuse me more.
Imagine circumstances C where there is only one free agent, Eve, who
makes only one free choice: whether to eat a yummy apple or to dance a
merry jig (no other options are available, and it is not possible to do
both), and this choice is significantly free because God forbade Eve to
eat the apple. Eve has no inclination to disobey God or act
unreasonably as such. Eve, however, has a desire to eat the
apple on account of its yumminess or to dance the jig on account of its
merriness. Call these circumstances C. Now, let C* be circumstances
just like these, except that God instead forbade Eve to dance the jig.
Now, suppose TWD holds. Then, C→(Eve freely eats apple) and C*→(Eve
freely dances jig). But this contradicts (**), since C* dominates C in
respect of apple-eating for Eve. Why does domination hold? Well, any
operative consideration in favor of apple-eating in C (namely the
yumminess of the apple) is present in C*, and any operative
consideration against apple-eating (namely the merriness of the jig) in
C* is present in C. The only difference is that the fact that God
forbids the apple-eating in C but it is the jig-dancing that is
forbidden in C*; but given that Eve has no inclination to act
unreasonably or disobediently as such, this does nothing to contradict
C’s being dominated by C* in respect of apple-eating (that God forbids
apple-eating in C either counts for nothing or counts against
apple-eating in C, etc.)
It goes on like this for a little while longer, and then stops, which I take to mean that some conclusion has been reached. However, I have begun to bleed rather profusely from my right eye, thereby making it difficult to read.